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I. Introduction
stability and competitive equilibrium 967The analysis of markets with heterogeneous agents and personalized
prices has a long tradition in economics, which began with the canoni-
cal one-to-one assignment model of Koopmans and Beckmann ð1957Þ,
Gale ð1960Þ, and Shapley and Shubik ð1971Þ. In thismodel, agents on one
side of the market are matched to objects ðor agentsÞ on the other side,
and each “match” generates a pair-specific surplus. Agents’ utilities are
quasi-linear in money, and arbitrary monetary transfers between the two
sides are allowed. In this case, the efficient assignment—the one thatmax-
imizes the sum of all involved parties’ payoffs—can be supported by the
price mechanism as a competitive equilibrium outcome. Moreover, sev-
eral solution concepts ðcompetitive equilibrium, core, and pairwise sta-
bilityÞ essentially coincide.
Crawford and Knoer ð1981Þ extend the assignment model to a richer
setting, in which heterogeneous firms formmatches with heterogeneous
workers. In the Crawford and Knoer setting, one firm can be matched to
multiple workers, but each worker can be matched to at most one firm.
Crawford and Knoer assume that preferences are separable across pairs;
that is, the payoff from a particular firm-worker pair is independent of
the other matches the firm forms. Crawford and Knoer do not rely on
the linear programming duality theory used in previous work; instead,
they use a modification of the deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale
and Shapley ð1962Þ to prove their results, thus demonstrating a close link
between the concepts of pairwise stability and competitive equilibrium.
Kelso andCrawford ð1982Þ then extend the previous results, showing that
the restrictive assumption of the separability of preferences across pairs
is inessential: it is enough that firms view workers as substitutes for each
other.
In this paper, we show that the results from the two-sided models de-
scribed above continue to hold in a much richer environment in which a
network of heterogeneous agents can trade indivisible goods or services
via bilateral contracts. Some agents can be involved in production, buying
inputs from other agents, turning them into outputs at some cost, and
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then selling the outputs. We find that if all agents’ preferences satisfy a
suitably generalized substitutability condition, then stable outcomes and
968 journal of political economycompetitive equilibria are guaranteed to exist and are efficient. More-
over, in that case, the sets of competitive equilibria and stable outcomes
are in a sense equivalent. These results apply to arbitrary trading networks
and do not require any assumptions on the network structure such as two-
sidedness or acyclicity.
In particular, our framework does not require a “vertical” network
structure. Consider, for example, the market for used cars—a $300 bil-
lion market in the United States alone.1 The participants in this market
are the sellers, who no longer need their old cars; the buyers, who want
to purchase used cars; and the car dealers, who buy, refurbish, and resell
used cars. Sellers and buyers can trade directly with each other or they
can trade with dealers. If all trade flowed in one direction ði.e., sellers
sold cars only to dealers and buyers, and dealers sold cars only to buy-
ersÞ, this market would fit naturally into the vertical network model of
Ostrovsky ð2008Þ. However, an important feature of the used car market
is trade among dealers. For instance, of the 15.6 million used cars sold
by franchised dealers in the United States in 2011, almost half ð6.9 mil-
lionÞ were sold “wholesale,” that is, to dealers rather than to individual
customers ðNADA 2012Þ.2 Among independent dealers, more than two-
thirds reported selling cars to other dealers ðNIADA 2011Þ.3 Such trades
are explicitly ruled out in the vertical network setting.4 By contrast, the
generality of our model—specifically, the accommodation of fully gen-
eral trading network structures—makes it possible to study stable out-
comes and competitive equilibria in settings like the used car market,
where trade can flow not only “vertically” but also “horizontally.”5
The presence of continuously transferable utility is essential for our re-
sults. Hatfield and Kominers ð2012Þ show that without continuous trans-
1 See http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1058.pdf, table 1058.
2 Some of these interdealer trades may comprise cycles. Consider, e.g., a BMW dealer
who receives a used Lexus as a trade-in. For this dealer, it may be more profitable to resell
the traded-in car to a Lexus dealer instead of an individual customer because the Lexus
dealer can have Lexus-trainedmechanics inspect and refurbish the car, assign it a “Certified
Pre-Owned” status, provide a Lexus-backed warranty, and offer other valuable services and
add-ons that the BMW dealer cannot provide. Likewise, a Lexus dealer may prefer to sell a
traded-in BMW to a BMW dealer instead of an individual customer.
3 “Franchised” dealers are typically associated with a specific car manufacturer or a small
number of manufacturers and sell both new and used cars. “Independent” dealers sell only
used cars. Trade among dealers includes transactions that take place at wholesale auctions,
where only dealers are allowed to purchase cars ðTadelis and Zettelmeyer 2011; Larsen
2013Þ, and direct dealer-to-dealer transactions ðNIADA 2011Þ.
4 See Sec. IV.C for a formal discussion of the restrictions imposed in the prior literature.
5 Other examples of markets in which horizontal trade and subcontracting are common
include reinsurance and securities underwriting, construction, and materials fabrication ðKa-
mien, Li, and Samet 1989; Spiegel 1993; Baake, Oechssler, and Schenk 1999; Gale, Hausch,
and Stegeman 2000; Patrik 2001; Powers and Shubik 2001; Marion 2013Þ.
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fers, in markets that lack a vertical structure, stable outcomes may not
exist. Even in vertical trading networks, without continuously transferable
stability and competitive equilibrium 969utility, stable outcomes are not guaranteed to be Pareto efficient ðBlair
1988; Westkamp 2010Þ. Another key assumption, which is also essential
for the existence of stable outcomes in the previous matching literature,
is the substitutability of preferences: we prove a “maximal domain” theo-
rem showing that if any agent’s preferences are not substitutable, then
substitutable preferences can be found for other agents such that nei-
ther competitive equilibria nor stable outcomes exist. We discuss the eco-
nomic content of the substitutability assumption in Section II.B after for-
mally defining it.6
In our model, contracts specify a buyer, a seller, provision of a good or
service, and a monetary transfer. An agent may be involved in some con-
tracts as a seller and in other contracts as a buyer. Agents’ preferences are
defined by cardinal utility functions over sets of contracts and are quasi-
linear with respect to the numeraire. To incorporate technological feasi-
bility constraints ðe.g., a baker cannot produce bread without buying any
flourÞ, we allow agents’ utilities for certain production plans to be unbound-
edly negative. We say that preferences are fully substitutable if contracts
are substitutes for each other in a generalized sense; that is, whenever an
agent gains a new purchase opportunity, he becomes both less willing to
make other purchases and more willing to make sales, and whenever he
gains a new sales opportunity, he becomes both less willing tomake other
sales and more willing to make purchases. This intuitive substitutability
condition has appeared in the literature onmatching in vertical networks
ðOstrovsky 2008; Westkamp 2010; Hatfield and Kominers 2012Þ and gen-
eralizes the classical notions of substitutability in two-sided settings ðKelso
and Crawford 1982; Roth 1984; Hatfield and Milgrom 2005Þ. Full sub-
stitutability is equivalent to the gross substitutes and complements condition
of the literature on competitive equilibria in exchange economies with
indivisible objects ðGul and Stacchetti 1999, 2000; Sun and Yang 2006,
2009Þ. Full substitutability is also equivalent to the submodularity of the
indirect utility function ðGul and Stacchetti 1999; Ausubel and Milgrom
2002Þ.7
Our main results are as follows. We first show that when preferences
are fully substitutable, competitive equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Our
proof is constructive. Its key idea is to consider an associated two-sided
many-to-one matching market in which “firms” are the agents and “work-
ers” are the possible trades in the original economy. Fully substitutable
utilities of the agents in the original economy give rise to substitutable ðin
the Kelso-Crawford senseÞ preferences of the firms in the associated two-
6 In that section, we also argue that full substitutability is a natural assumption on the
preferences of sellers, buyers, and dealers in the used car setting.
7 The stated equivalences are shown in our companion paper ðHatfield et al. 2013Þ.
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sided market, and the equilibrium outcome in the associated market can
be mapped back to a competitive equilibrium of the original economy.8
970 journal of political economyWhile the construction of the associated market is conceptually natu-
ral, it involves several additional steps that deal with the potentially un-
bounded utilities in the original economy and ensure that the equilibrium
of the associated economy is “full employment” ðas this is required for
mapping it back into an equilibrium of the original economyÞ. Having
established the existence of competitive equilibria, we then use standard
techniques to demonstrate analogues of the first and second welfare the-
orems, as well as the lattice structure of the set of competitive equilibrium
prices. While these properties are of independent interest, we also use
them in proving some of our subsequent results.
We then turn to our key results establishing the connections between
competitive equilibria and stable outcomes. First, we show that ðeven
when preferences are not fully substitutableÞ any competitive equilib-
rium induces a stable outcome. The proof of this result is similar in spirit
to the standard arguments showing that competitive equilibrium out-
comes are in the core, but it is more subtle. Unlike the core, stability also
rules out the possibility that agents may profitably recontract while main-
taining some of their prior contractual relationships with other agents.
Second, we prove a converse: under fully substitutable preferences, any sta-
ble outcome corresponds to a competitive equilibrium. These two results
establish an essential equivalence between the two solution concepts un-
der full substitutability. While this equivalence is analogous to a similar
finding of Kelso and Crawford ð1982Þ for two-sided many-to-one match-
ing markets, it is more complex. In the setting of Kelso and Crawford, one
can construct “missing” prices for unrealized trades simply by consider-
ing those trades one by one, because in that setting each worker can be
employed by at most one firm. In our setting, that simple procedure
would not work because each agent can be involved in multiple trades.
To get around this difficulty, for a given stable outcome, we consider a new
economy consisting of trades that are not part of the stable outcome and
modified utilities that assume that the agents have access to the trades
that are part of the stable outcome. We then show that preferences in the
modified economy are fully substitutable and use our earlier results to
establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the modified econ-
omy. Finally, we use the prices for the trades in the competitive equilib-
rium of the modified economy to construct a competitive equilibrium in
the original economy.
8 This technique is a generalization of the construction of Sun and Yang ð2006Þ, which
maps an exchange economy with two classes of goods ðwith preferences satisfying the gross
substitutes and complements condition over these two classesÞ to an exchange economy in
which preferences satisfy the Kelso-Crawford substitutability condition. In Secs. IV.B and
IV.C, we discuss in more detail the connection of our results with those of Sun and Yang.
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Thus, fully substitutable preferences are sufficient for the existence of
stable outcomes and competitive equilibria and for the essential equiv-
stability and competitive equilibrium 971alence of these two concepts. Our final main result establishes that full
substitutability is also necessary, in the maximal domain sense: if any
agent’s preferences are not fully substitutable, then fully substitutable
preferences can be found for other agents such that no stable outcome
exists.9
After presenting our main results, we analyze the relationship between
stability as defined in this paper and several other solution concepts.
Generalizing the results of Shapley and Shubik ð1971Þ and Sotomayor
ð2007Þ, we show that all stable outcomes are in the core ðalthough, in con-
trast to the basic one-to-one assignment model, the converse is not true
in our settingÞ. We then consider the strong group stability solution con-
cept and show that, in contrast to the results of Echenique and Oviedo
ð2006Þ and Klaus and Walzl ð2009Þ for matching markets without trans-
fers, in our setting the set of stable outcomes coincides with the set of
strongly group stable outcomes.10
Finally, we show that our model embeds the more common setting in
which agents are indifferent over their trading partners. We introduce a
condition on utilities formalizing this idea and show that, under this
condition, a competitive equilibrium with “anonymous”—rather than
personalized—prices always exists. Our framework also allows for a hy-
brid case, in which prices are personalized for some goods and anony-
mous for others.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
formalize our model. In Section III, we present our main results. In Sec-
9 In the setting of two-sided many-to-one matching with transfers, Kelso and Crawford
ð1982Þ show that substitutability is sufficient for the existence of stable outcomes and
competitive equilibria; Gul and Stacchetti ð1999Þ and Hatfield and Kojima ð2008Þ prove
corresponding necessity results. In a setting in which two types of indivisible objects need
to be allocated to consumers, Sun and Yang ð2006Þ show that competitive equilibria are
guaranteed to exist if consumers view objects of the same type as substitutes and view objects
of different types as complements ðsee also Sec. IV.BÞ. Sufficiency and necessity of fully
substitutable preferences also obtain in settings ofmany-to-manymatchingwith andwithout
contracts ðRoth ½1984, Echenique and Oviedo ½2006, Klaus and Walzl ½2009, and Hatfield
and Kominers ½2013a prove sufficiency results; Hatfield and Kojima ½2008 and Hatfield
and Kominers ½2013a prove necessity resultsÞ andmatching in vertical networks ðOstrovsky
½2008 and Hatfield and Kominers ½2012 prove sufficiency; Hatfield and Kominers ½2012
prove necessityÞ. Substitutable preferences are sufficient for the existence of a stable out-
come in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts ðHatfield and Milgrom 2005Þ
but are not necessary ðHatfield and Kojima 2008, 2010; Hatfield and Kominers 2013bÞ. In
work subsequent to our paper, Baldwin and Klemperer ð2013Þ use the techniques of tropical
geometry to obtain alternative proofs of the sufficiency and necessity of full substitutability
for the existence of competitive equilibria in indivisible goods economies. They also use these
techniques to explore more general classes of preferences.
10 In the companion paper ðHatfield et al. 2013Þ, we also consider chain stability, ex-
tending the definition of Ostrovsky ð2008Þ. While chain stability is logically weaker than sta-
bility, we show that the two concepts are equivalent when agents’ preferences are fully substi-
tutable. Hatfield and Kominers ð2012Þ prove an analogous result for the setting of Ostrovsky.
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tion IV, we study the relationships among competitive equilibria, stable
outcomes, and other solution concepts. We present conclusions in Sec-
972 journal of political economytion V. Except where mentioned otherwise, the proofs of all results are
presented in Appendix A.
II. ModelThere is a finite set I of agents in the economy. These agents can par-
ticipate in bilateral trades. Each trade q is associated with a buyer bðqÞ ∈ I
and a seller sðqÞ ∈ I, with bðqÞ ≠ sðqÞ. The set of possible trades, denoted
Q, is finite and exogenously given. The set Qmay contain multiple trades
that have the same buyer and the same seller. For instance, a worker
ðsellerÞ may be hired by a firm ðbuyerÞ in a variety of capacities with dif-
ferent job conditions and characteristics, and each possible type of job
may be represented by a different trade. One firmmay sell multiple units
of a good ðor several different goodsÞ to another firm, with each unit rep-
resented by a separate trade. Furthermore, a firmmay be the seller in one
trade and the buyer in another trade with the same partner; formally, the
set Q can contain trades q and w such that sðqÞ5 bðwÞ and sðwÞ5 bðqÞ.11
It is convenient to think of a trade as representing the nonpecuniary
aspects of a transaction between a seller and a buyer ðalthough in prin-
ciple it could include some “financial” terms and conditions as wellÞ.
The purely financial aspect of a transaction associated with a trade q is
represented by a price pq; the complete vector of prices for all trades in
the economy is denoted by p ∈ RjQj. Formally, a contract x is a pair ðq; pqÞ,
with q ∈ Q denoting the trade and pq ∈ R denoting the price at which the
trade occurs. The set of available contracts is X ; Q  R. For any set of
contracts Y ⊆ X , we denote by tðY Þ the set of trades involved in contracts
in Y:
tðY Þ; fq ∈ Q : ðq; pqÞ ∈ Y for some pq ∈ Rg:
For a contract x 5 ðq; pqÞ, we denote by bðxÞ; bðqÞ and sðxÞ; sðqÞ the
buyer and seller associated with the trade q of contract x. Consider any
set of contracts Y ⊆ X . We denote by Y→i the set of “upstream” contracts
for i in Y, that is, the set of contracts in Y in which agent i is the buyer:
Y→i ; fy ∈ Y : i 5 bðyÞg. Similarly, we denote by Yi→ the set of “down-
stream” contracts for i in Y, that is, the set of contracts in Y in which
agent i is the seller: Yi→ ; fy ∈ Y : i 5 sðyÞg. We denote by Yi the set of
contracts in Y in which agent i is involved as the buyer or the seller:
11 Such a pair of trades constitutes a cycle of length 2; since the model places no re-
strictions on the structure of the set of trades, longer cycles may also be present in the
economy. The incorporation of cycles into the model is what allows us to accommodate
markets with horizontal trading relationships such as the used car market discussed in the
introduction.
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Yi ;Y→i [ Yi→. We use analogous notation to denote the subsets of trades
associated with some agent i. We let aðY Þ; [ fbðyÞ; sðyÞg denote the
stability and competitive equilibrium 973y∈Y
set of agents involved in contracts in Y as buyers or sellers.
We say that the set of contracts Y is feasible if there is no trade q and
prices pq and p^q with pq ≠ p^q such that both contracts ðq; pqÞ and ðq; p^qÞ
are in Y ; that is, a set of contracts is feasible if each trade is associated
with at most one contract in that set. An outcome A ⊆ X is a feasible set of
contracts.12 Thus, an outcome specifies which trades are executed and
what the associated prices are but does not specify prices for trades
that do not take place. An arrangement is a pair ½W; p, whereW ⊆ Q is a set
of trades and p ∈ RjQj is a vector of prices for all trades in the economy.
We denote by kð½W; pÞ; [w∈Wfðw; pwÞg the set of contracts induced by
the arrangement ½W; p. Note that kð½W; pÞ is an outcome and that
tðkð½W; pÞÞ5W.
A. PreferencesEach agent i has a valuation function ui over sets of trades W ⊆ Qi ; we
extend ui to Q by taking uiðWÞ; uiðWiÞ for any W ⊆ Q. The valuation ui
gives rise to a quasi-linear utility function Ui over sets of trades and the
associated transfers. We formalize this in two different ways. First, for any
outcome Y, we say that
UiðY Þ; uiðtðY ÞÞ1 o
ðq;pqÞ∈Yi→
pq 2 o
ðq;pqÞ∈Y→i
pq:
Second, for any arrangement ½W; p, we say that
Uið½W; pÞ; uiðWÞ1 o
w∈Wi→
pw 2 o
w∈W→i
pw:
Note that, by construction, Uið½W; pÞ5 Uiðkð½W; pÞÞ.
We allow uiðWÞ to take the value2` for some sets of trades W in order
to incorporate various technological constraints.13 However, we also as-
12 In the literature on matching with contracts, the term “allocation” has been used to
refer to a set of contracts. Unfortunately, the term “allocation” is also used in the com-
petitive equilibrium literature to denote an assignment of goods, without specifying trans-
fers. For this reason, to avoid confusion,weuse the term“outcome” to refer to a feasible set of
contracts.
13 For instance, if agent i requires an input to produce the output associated with trade q
and cannot produce that output without that input, then uiðfqgÞ 5 2`. Incorporating
such constraints is essential for modeling economies with intermediate production. Note
that such constraints are ruled out in the literature on exchange economies with indivisible
goods ðsee, e.g., Bikhchandani and Mamer 1997; Gul and Stacchetti 1999Þ, which assumes
that every bundle of goods is acceptable to every agent.
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sume that for all i, the outside option is finite: uið∅Þ ∈ R. That is, no
agent is “forced” to sign any contracts at extremely unfavorable prices;
974 journal of political economyhe always has an outside option of completely withdrawing from the mar-
ket at some potentially high but finite price.
The utility function Ui gives rise to both demand and choice corre-
spondences. The choice correspondence of agent i given a set of contracts
Y ⊆ X is defined as the collection of sets of contracts maximizing the
utility of agent i :
CiðY Þ; arg max
Z⊆Yi ;Z is feasible
UiðZ Þ:
The demand correspondence of agent i given a price vector p ∈ RjQj is de-
fined as the collection of sets of trades maximizing the utility of agent i
under prices p :
DiðpÞ; arg max
W⊆Qi
Uið½W; pÞ:
Note that while the demand correspondence always contains at least
one ðpossibly emptyÞ set of trades, the choice correspondence may be
empty-valued ðe.g., if Y consists of all contracts with prices strictly be-
tween 0 and 1Þ. If the set Y is finite, then the choice correspondence is
also guaranteed to contain at least one set of contracts.
We can now introduce the full substitutability concept for our setting:
When presented with additional contractual opportunities to purchase,
an agent both rejects any previously rejected purchase opportunities and
continues to choose any previously chosen sale opportunities. Analo-
gously, when presented with additional contractual opportunities to sell,
an agent rejects any previously rejected sale opportunities and continues
to choose any previously chosen purchase opportunities. Formally, we
define full substitutability in the language of sets and choices, adapting
and merging the same-side substitutability and cross-side complemen-
tarity conditions of Ostrovsky ð2008Þ.
Definition 1. The preferences of agent i are fully substitutable if
1. for all sets of contracts Y, Z ⊆ Xi such that jCiðZ Þj5 jCiðY Þj5 1,
Yi→ 5 Zi→, and Y→i ⊆ Z→i , for the unique Y * ∈ CiðY Þ and Z * ∈ CiðZ Þ,
we have Y→i =Y *→i ⊆ Z→i =Z *→i and Y *i→ ⊆ Z *i→;
2. for all sets of contracts Y, Z ⊆ Xi such that jCiðZ Þj5 jCiðY Þj5 1,
Y→i 5 Z→i , and Yi→ ⊆ Zi→, for the unique Y * ∈ CiðY Þ and Z * ∈ CiðZ Þ,
we have Yi→ =Y *i→ ⊆ Zi→ =Z *i→ and Y *→i ⊆ Z *→i .
In other words, the choice correspondence Ci is fully substitutable if
ðonce attention is restricted to sets for which Ci is single-valuedÞ, whenThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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the set of opportunities available to i on one side expands, i both re-
jects a ðweaklyÞ larger set of contracts on that side and selects a ðweaklyÞ
stability and competitive equilibrium 975larger set of contracts on the other side.
B. Discussion of the Full Substitutability ConditionWhile definition 1 is natural and intuitive, it does rule out some eco-
nomically important cases. First, it rules out the possibility of large fixed
costs, which, for example, may make an agent willing to sell several units
of its product at a particular price p but unwilling to sell just one such
unit at the same price. More generally, it rules out economies of scale
and complementarities in production or consumption. ðOf course, these
cases are also ruled out by the usual Kelso-Crawford substitutability con-
dition in two-sided markets.Þ In addition, the full substitutability condi-
tion rules out the possibility that an intermediary has aggregate capacity
constraints while able to produce multiple types of output, each requir-
ing a different type of input. For instance, suppose that agent i ða bakeryÞ
can make white or brown bread from white or brown flour, respectively.
Suppose that i is profitably producing and selling white bread and gains
an opportunity to sell brown bread profitably. If i is capacity constrained,
he may shift some of his capacity from producing white bread to pro-
ducing brown bread, thus buying less white flour ðor perhaps not buy-
ing it at allÞ. In this case, the preferences of agent i are not fully substi-
tutable as the expansion of the set of options available to i on one side
leads i to drop some of his contracts on the other side.14 Note that our
domain maximality result ðtheorem 7Þ implies that in all the cases in
which preferences are not fully substitutable, the existence of stable out-
comes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
At the same time, the full substitutability condition holds for a variety
of important classes of production and utility functions. The most straight-
forward case in which full substitutability holds is the case of homoge-
neous goods, with diminishing marginal utilities of consumption and in-
creasing marginal costs of production. For example, suppose that some
agents in the market participate only as consumers ðthey do not sell any-
thing in the marketÞ, and their payoffs depend only on the number of
units of the good that they purchase, with each additional unit being less
valuable than the previous one. Some agents participate only as sellers
ðthey do not buy anything in the marketÞ, and their production costs de-
pend only on the number of units that they sell, with each additional unit
being more expensive to produce than the previous one. Finally, some
agents are intermediaries who both buy units of an input good and pro-
14 We thank a referee for this example.This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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duce units of an output good. They require one unit of input to produce
one unit of output and incur a manufacturing cost, which depends only
976 journal of political economyon the number of units “transformed,” with each additional unit being
more expensive to “transform” than the previous one. In this economy,
all preferences are fully substitutable. Full substitutability also holds in
various generalizations of this model, incorporating, for example, hetero-
geneous transportation costs or the possibility that some intermediaries
may derive utility from consuming some of the inputs or have the capabil-
ity to produce some outputs without buying the corresponding inputs.
For a richer class of fully substitutable preferences that involves “sub-
stantively” heterogeneous goods, we return to the used car setting dis-
cussed in the introduction. Buyers and sellers of used cars typically want
to trade at most one car; thus, their preferences trivially satisfy the full
substitutability condition.15 The preferences of dealers are more com-
plex. Consider a dealer d. The dealer’s goal is to maximize the difference
between the prices at which he sells used cars and the amounts he pays
to acquire and refurbish them. Formally, let Y be a set of contracts,
representing the options available to dealer d. The set Y→d ⊆ Y is the set
of car offers available to dealer d, in which each element ðJ; pJÞ specifies
the characteristics of the offered car and its price. The set Yd→ ⊆ Y is the
set of requests for cars available to dealer d, in which each element ðw; pwÞ
specifies the characteristics of the requested car and its price. Note that
these offers and requests can come from other dealers or from indi-
vidual sellers or buyers.
Dealer d knows whether any given car offer J and request w are com-
patible, that is, whether the characteristics of car offer J match the char-
acteristics of request w ðignoring pricesÞ.16 The dealer also knows the
cost cJ;w of preparing a given car J for resale to satisfy a compatible re-
15 Important exceptions are financial leasing companies selling off-lease vehicles and
rental car agencies selling fleet vehicles ðTadelis and Zettelmeyer 2011; Larsen 2013Þ. In
both of these cases, sellers’ payoffs are essentially additive across cars; hence, their pref-
erences satisfy the full substitutability condition.
16 For instance, a blue Toyota Camry of a particular year and mileage would be compati-
ble with a request for a Toyota Camry with amatching year andmileage range but would not
be compatible with a request for a blueHonda Accord or for a blue Camry with the “wrong”
year ormileage range.Note that we donot require a buyer of a used car to have demandonly
for a specific make-model-year-mileage-option combination; a buyer’s preferences can
specify, e.g., that the value of a Toyota Camry to him is $2,000 higher than the value of a
Honda Accord with the same characteristics, or that each additional 1,000 miles on the
car’s odometer decreases that car’s value by $150. In other words, each request w is detailed
enough that the buyer has the same value for any car that matches the request w, and the
buyer’s preferences are represented by a set of requests that he is indifferent over ð“I am
willing to pay $15,000 for a Toyota Camry with such-and-such characteristics or $14,500 for
a Toyota Camry with so-and-so characteristics or $13,000 for a Honda Accord with such-and-
such characteristics or . . .”Þ.
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quest w.17 The dealer’s objective is to match some of the car offers in Y→d
with some of the requests in Y in a way that maximizes his profit,
stability and competitive equilibrium 977d→
oðJ;wÞ∈mðpw 2 pJ 2 cJ;wÞ, where m denotes the set of compatible car offer-
request pairs that the dealer selects.
Formally, define a matching, m, as a set of pairs of trades ðJ;wÞ such
that J is an element of Q→d ði.e., a car available to dealer d Þ, w is an el-
ement of Qd→ ði.e., a car request received by dealer d Þ, J and w are
compatible, and each trade in Qd belongs to at most one pair in m. Slightly
abusing notation, let the cost of matching m, cðmÞ, be equal to the sum of
the costs of pairs involved in m ði.e., cðmÞ5oðJ;wÞ∈mcJ;wÞ.
For a set of trades Y ⊆ Qd , let M ðYÞ denote the set of matchings m of
elements of Y such that every element of Y belongs to exactly one pair
in m.18 Then the valuation of dealer d over sets of trades Y ⊆ Qd is given
by
udðYÞ5 2minm∈MðYÞ cðmÞ if MðYÞ ≠ ∅2` if MðYÞ5∅;

that is, it is equal to the cost of the cheapest way of matching all car re-
quests and offers in Y if such a matching is possible and is equal to 2`
otherwise.19 ðNote that udð∅Þ5 0.Þ The utility function of d over feasible
sets of contracts is induced by valuation ud in the standard way, formal-
ized in the beginning of Section II.A.
Proposition 1. The preferences of dealer d are fully substitutable.
For intuition, suppose that a new request ðw; pwÞ is added to the set of
options Y available to dealer d ðresulting in a new set of options Z 5
Y [ fðw; pwÞgÞ, and the dealer reoptimizes; denote the corresponding op-
timal choices by Y * and Z *. If the new request ðw; pwÞ remains unfilled af-
ter reoptimization ððw; pwÞ ∉ Z *Þ or it is satisfied by a car offer ðJ; pJÞ that
was not previously a part of the optimal choice ððJ; pJÞ ∉ Y *Þ, then all
other car offers and requests in the optimal solution remain unaffected
and the conditions of definition 1 are immediately satisfied. If, on the
other hand, this new request ðw; pwÞ is matched to a car offer ðJ; pJÞ that
was previously a part of the optimal choice of dealer d ððJ; pJÞ ∈ Y *Þ, then
17 This cost may involve inspecting the car, repairing it, detailing it, and so on. Note that
the cost may be specific to request w; e.g., a car sold to an individual buyer may need to be
repaired and detailed, while the same car sold to another dealer may not require these
extra costs.
18 Of course, MðYÞ can be empty; e.g., it is empty if the number of car offers in Y is not
equal to the number of car requests or if there are some requests in Y that are not
compatible with any car offers in Y.
19 This assumption ensures that any set chosen by dealer d contains an equal number of
car offers and car requests. In principle, we could consider a more general ðyet still fully
substitutableÞ valuation function in which a dealer has utility for a car that he does not
resell. In that case, the dealer may end up choosing more car offers than car requests.
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the remaining contracts in the optimal solution are affected in exactly
the same way as they would be affected if contract ðJ; p Þ were simply re-
978 journal of political economyJ
moved from the set of options Y and the dealer were asked to reoptimize.
Thus, if the preferences of dealer d satisfy the requirements of full substi-
tutability for option sets of size k, they also satisfy these requirements for
option sets of size k 1 1. This observation is the key inductive step in the
proof of proposition 1.20
Concluding the discussion of full substitutability, we note that defi-
nition 1 restricts attention to sets of contracts for which choices are
single-valued. In the companion paper ðHatfield et al. 2013Þ, we show
that this definition is equivalent to more general versions that explicitly
deal with indifferences and multivalued correspondences. In addition,
this definition is equivalent to several conditions, including a general-
ization of the “gross substitutes and complements” condition on de-
mand functions ðSun and Yang 2006Þ and the submodularity of the
indirect utility function ViðpÞ; maxW⊆Qi Uið½W; pÞ. Our proofs rely on
several equivalent definitions of full substitutability developed in the
companion paper; we indicate in Appendix A wherever this is the case.
C. Stability and Competitive EquilibriumThe main solution concepts that we study are stability and competitive
equilibrium. Both concepts specify which trades are executed and what
the associated prices are. Competitive equilibria also specify prices for
trades that are not formed.
Definition 2. An outcome A is stable if it is
1. individually rational: Ai ∈ CiðAÞ for all i;
2. unblocked: there is no feasible nonempty blocking set Z ⊆ X such that
a. Z \ A5 ∅, and
b. for all i ∈ aðZ Þ, for all Y ∈ CiðZ [ AÞ, we have Zi ⊆ Y .
Individual rationality requires that no agent can become strictly better
off by dropping some of the contracts that he is involved in. This is a
standard requirement in the matching literature. The second condition
states that when presented with a stable outcome A, one cannot propose
a new set of contracts Z such that, for every agent i involved in these new
20 Note that the definition of the valuation function ud of dealer d implicitly rules out
the complications listed in the beginning of Sec. II.B: fixed costs, economies of scale, and
capacity constraints. In the presence of such complications, the preferences of dealer d may
not be fully substitutable. For another example of an intermediary with fully substitutable
preferences over “substantively” heterogeneous goods, see the iron ore/scrap/steel plant
example at the end of Sec. I.A of Ostrovsky ð2008Þ. For a related class of rich substitutable
preferences of agents who form contracts only on one side ði.e., only buy or only sellÞ, see the
class of “endowed assignment valuations” discussed by Hatfield and Milgrom ð2005Þ.
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contracts, Zi is a subset of any optimal choice from Zi [ Ai . This require-
ment is a natural adaptation of the stability condition of Hatfield and
stability and competitive equilibrium 979Kominers ð2012Þ to the current setting. We discuss the relationship be-
tween our concept of stability and several other stability concepts con-
sidered in the matching literature, such as the core and strong stability,
in Section IV.A.
Our second solution concept is competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3. An arrangement ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium if, for
all i ∈ I , Wi ∈ DiðpÞ.
This is the standard concept of competitive equilibrium, adapted to
the current setting: market clearing is “built in,” because each trade inW
carries with it the corresponding buyer and seller, and in competitive
equilibrium each agent is ðweaklyÞ optimizing given market prices. Note
that here we implicitly allow for “personalized” prices: identical goods
may be sold by a seller to two different buyers at two different prices. In
many settings, sellers may not care whom they sell their goods to, and buy-
ers may not care whom they buy from; hence, it is natural to talk about
“anonymous,” good-specific prices rather than personalized prices. In-
deed, this is how the classical models of competitive equilibrium are usu-
ally set up and interpreted. In Section IV.B we show how to embed the
anonymous-price setting in our framework.
III. Main ResultsWe now present our three main contributions. First, we show that when
preferences are fully substitutable, competitive equilibria are guaran-
teed to exist and have a number of interesting properties, analogous to
those of competitive equilibria in two-sided settings. We then show that
under full substitutability, the set of competitive equilibria essentially coin-
cides with the set of stable outcomes. Finally, we show that if preferences
are not fully substitutable, then stable outcomes and competitive equilibria
need not exist.
A. Existence and Properties of Competitive EquilibriaTheorem 1. Suppose that agents’ preferences are fully substitutable.
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
A key idea of the proof of theorem 1 is to associate to the original
market a two-sided many-to-one matching market with transfers, in
which each agent corresponds to a “firm” and each trade corresponds to a
“worker.” The valuation of firm i for hiring a set of workers W ⊆ Qi in the
associated two-sided market is given by
viðWÞ; uiðW→i [ ðQ =WÞi→Þ: ð1ÞThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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Intuitively, we think of the firm as employing all the workers associated
with trades that the firm buys and with trades that the firm does not sell. We
980 journal of political economyshow that vi satisfies the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford
ð1982Þ as long as ui is fully substitutable.21 Workers strongly prefer towork
rather than being unemployed, and their utilities are monotonically in-
creasing in wages. Also, every worker q has a strong preference for being
employed by bðqÞ or sðqÞ rather than some other firm i ∈ I =fbðqÞ; sðqÞg.
With these definitions, we have a two-sided market of the type studied by
Kelso and Crawford ð1982Þ. In this market, a competitive equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist, and in every equilibrium, every worker q is matched
to bðqÞ or sðqÞ.
We then transform this competitive equilibrium back into a set of
trades and prices for the original economy as follows: Trade q is included
in the set of executed trades in the original economy if the worker q is
hired by bðqÞ in the associated market, and trade q is not included in the
set of executed trades if worker q is hired by sðqÞ. We use the wages in
the associated market as prices in the original market. We thus obtain a
competitive equilibrium of the original economy: Given the prices gener-
ated, a tradeq is demanded by its buyer if and only if it is also demanded
by its seller ði.e., not demanded by the seller in the associated marketÞ.
This construction also provides an algorithm for finding a competitive
equilibrium. For instance, once we have transformed the original econ-
omy into an associated market, we can use an ascending auction for work-
ers to find the minimal-price competitive equilibrium of the associated
market; we may then map that competitive equilibrium back to a compet-
itive equilibrium of the original economy.
An important issue that we need to address in the above construction
is that the modified valuation function in equation ð1Þ may in principle
be unbounded and take the value 2` for some sets of trades, violating
the assumptions of Kelso and Crawford ð1982Þ. To deal with this issue,
we further modify the valuation function by bounding it in a way that
preserves full substitutability and at the same time ensures that the equi-
librium derived from the “bounded” economy remains an equilibrium of
the original economy. We also need to ensure that the equilibrium in the
associated two-sided market exhibits full employment in order to be able
to map an equilibrium of the associated economy to an equilibrium of
the original one.
We now turn to the properties of competitive equilibria in this econ-
omy. While these properties, as well as their proofs, are similar to those
21 This construction is analogous to the one Sun and Yang ð2006Þ use to transform an
exchange economy with two types of goods, which are substitutable within each type and
complementary across types, into an economy in which preferences satisfy the gross sub-
stitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford ð1982Þ.
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of competitive equilibria in two-sided settings ðGul and Stacchetti 1999;
Sun and Yang 2006Þ, it is important to verify that they continue to hold
stability and competitive equilibrium 981in this richer environment. We also rely on some of these properties in
the proofs of our subsequent results.
We first note an analogue of the first welfare theorem in our economy.
Theorem 2. Suppose that ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium. Then
W is an efficient set of trades; that is,oi∈I uiðWÞ ≥ oi∈I uiðW0Þ for anyW0 ⊆ Q.
Our next result can be viewed as a strong version of the second welfare
theorem for our setting, providing a converse to theorem 2: For any
efficient set of trades W and any competitive equilibrium price vector p,
the arrangement ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium. Generically, the ef-
ficient set of trades is unique, in which case this statement follows imme-
diately from theorem 2. We show that it also holds when there are mul-
tiple efficient sets of trades.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agents’ preferences are fully substitut-
able. Then for any competitive equilibrium ½Y; p and efficient set of trades
W, ½W; p is also a competitive equilibrium.
The result of theorem 3 implies that the notion of a competitive equi-
librium price vector is well defined. Our next result shows that the set of
such vectors is a lattice.
Theorem 4. Suppose that agents’ preferences are fully substitut-
able. Then the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors is a lattice.
The lattice structure of the set of competitive equilibrium prices is
analogous to the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes for
economies without transferable utility. In those models, there is a buyer-
optimal and a seller-optimal stable outcome. In our model, the lattice
of equilibrium prices may in principle be unbounded. If the lattice is
bounded ðe.g., if all valuations ui are boundedÞ, then there exist lowest-
price and highest-price competitive equilibria.
B. The Relationship between Competitive Equilibria and Stable OutcomesWe now show how the sets of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria
are related. First, we show that for every competitive equilibrium ½W; p,
the associated outcome kð½W; pÞ is stable.
Theorem 5. Suppose that ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium. Then
kð½W; pÞ is stable.
If for some competitive equilibrium ½W; p the outcome kð½W; pÞ is not
stable, then either it is not individually rational or it is blocked. If it is
not individually rational for some agent i, then kð½W; pÞi ∉ Ciðkð½W; pÞÞ.
Hence, Wi ∉ DiðpÞ, and so ½W; p is not a competitive equilibrium. If
kð½W; pÞ admits a blocking set Z, then all the agents with contracts in Z
are strictly better off after the deviation. It follows that at the original
price vector p, there exists an agent i ∈ aðZ Þ who is strictly better offThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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combining trades from tðZ Þ with ðsome or all ofÞ his holdings in
tðkð½W; pÞÞ5W. Hence, W ∉ D ðpÞ, so ½W; p is not a competitive equi-
982 journal of political economyi i
librium. Note that this result does not rely on full substitutability.
However, it is not generally true that all stable outcomes correspond
to competitive equilibria. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 1. There are two agents, i and j, and two trades, x and J,
where sðxÞ5 sðJÞ5 i and bðxÞ5 bðJÞ5 j . Agents’ valuations are
uið∅Þ5 ujð∅Þ5 0;
uiðfxgÞ5 uiðfJgÞ5 uiðfx;JgÞ5 24;
ujðfxgÞ5 ujðfJgÞ5 ujðfx;JgÞ5 3:
In this case, ∅ is stable. Since ∅ is the only efficient set of trades, by
theorem 3 any competitive equilibrium must be of the form ½∅; p. How-
ever, we must then have px 1 pJ ≤ 4, as otherwise i will choose to sell at
least one of J or x. Moreover, we must have px, pJ ≥ 3, as otherwise j will
buy at least one of J or x. Clearly, all three inequalities cannot jointly
hold. Hence, while ∅ is stable, there is no corresponding competitive
equilibrium.
The key issue is that an outcome A specifies prices only for the trades
in tðAÞ, while a competitive equilibrium must specify prices for all trades
ðincluding those trades that do not transactÞ. Hence, in the presence of
complementarities, it is possible that, while an outcome A is stable, one
cannot assign prices to trades outside of tðAÞ in such a way that tðAÞi is
an optimal set of trades for every agent i given those prices. Note that
in example 1, the preferences of agent j are fully substitutable, but those
of agent i are not.
If, however, the preferences of all agents are fully substitutable, then
for any stable outcome A, we can in fact find a supporting set of prices p
such that ½tðAÞ; p is a competitive equilibrium and the prices of trades
that transact are the same as in A.
Theorem 6. Suppose that agents’ preferences are fully substitutable
and that A is a stable outcome. Then there exists a price vector p ∈ RjQj
such that ½tðAÞ; p is a competitive equilibrium, and if ðq; pqÞ ∈ A, then
pq 5 pq.
To construct a competitive equilibrium from a stable outcome A, we
need to find appropriate prices for the trades that are not part of the
stable outcome, that is, trades q ∈ Q =tðAÞ. In the case of two-sided mar-
kets, this can be done on a trade-by-trade basis, because it is sufficient to
verify that the price assigned to a trade will not make this trade desirable
for either its buyer or its seller given the prices of the trades that those
agents execute. In our setting, this approach does not work because the
willingness of a buyer to make a new purchase may also depend on theThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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prices assigned to the trades in which he is a potential seller. Thus, equi-
librium prices for trades in Q =tðAÞ are interdependent and need to be
stability and competitive equilibrium 983assigned simultaneously in a consistent manner.
To prove theorem 6, we start with the original market and the stable
outcome A and then construct a modified market. In this modified
market, the set of available trades is Q =tðAÞ, and the valuation of each
player i for a set of trades W ⊆ Q =tðAÞ is equal to the highest value that
he can attain by combining the trades inWi with various subsets of Ai . We
first show that the corresponding preferences of each player i are fully
substitutable; the modifiedmarket thus has a competitive equilibrium by
theorem 1. We then show that at least one such equilibrium has to be of
the form ½∅; p^ for some vector p^ ∈ RjQ =tðAÞj; otherwise, as we show, there
must exist a nonempty set that blocks A in the original economy ðthe
proof of this statement relies on theorems 2 and 3, our “first” and “sec-
ond” welfare theoremsÞ. Assigning the prices specified by p^ to the trades
that are not part of A, we obtain a competitive equilibrium of the origi-
nal economy.
C. Full Substitutability as a Maximal DomainWe now show a maximal domain result: if the preferences of any one
agent are not fully substitutable, then stable outcomes need not exist. In
fact, in that case we can construct simple preferences for other agents
such that no stable outcome exists.
Definition 4. The preferences of agent i are simple if it is possible
to ðaÞ partition the set Qi into sets F1; : : : ;FK such that for each k 5
1; : : : ;K ; jFkj ≤ 2, and (b) define functions uki on subsets of Fk such that
for each Y ⊆ Qi ,
uiðYÞ5 o
K
k51
uki ðY \ FkÞ;
and each uki satisfies the following conditions:
• if Fk ⊆ Q→i or Fk ⊆ Qi→ ði.e., all trades inFk are on the same sideÞ, then
uki ðY \ FkÞ ≠ 2` if jY \ Fk j ≤ 1, anduki ðY \ FkÞ5 2` if jY \ Fk j52;
• if Fk 5 fq;wg such that q ∈ Q→i and w ∈ Qi→, then uki ð∅Þ ≠ 2`,
uki ðfq;wgÞ ≠ 2`, and at least one of uki ðfqgÞ and uki ðfwgÞ is equal to
2`.
Simple preferences play a role similar to that of unit-demand preferences,
used in the Gul and Stacchetti ð1999Þ result characterizing the maximal
domain for the existence of competitive equilibria in exchange econo-
mies. However, in our setting we must allow an individual agent to act as
a set of unit-demand consumers, unit-supply producers, and intermedi-This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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aries who can transform exactly one unit of input into exactly one unit of
output. This is necessary as each contract specifies both a buyer and a
984 journal of political economyseller, and the violation of substitutability may occur for an agent i only
when he holds multiple contracts with another agent. Note that simple
preferences are fully substitutable.
Our maximal domain result also requires sufficient “richness” of the
set of trades. Specifically, we require that the set of trades Q is exhaustive,
that is, that for each distinct i, j ∈ I there exist w, q ∈ Q such that bðwÞ
5 sðqÞ5 i and bðqÞ5 sðwÞ5 j .
Theorem 7. Suppose that there are at least four agents and that the
set of trades is exhaustive. Then if the preferences of some agent are not
fully substitutable, there exist simple preferences for all other agents such
that no stable outcome exists.22
To understand the intuition behind theorem 7, consider the following
example.
Example 2. Agent i is just a buyer and has perfectly complementary
preferences over the trades x and J ðsðxÞ ≠ sðJÞÞ and is not interested in
other trades, that is, uiðfx;JgÞ5 1 and uiðfxgÞ5 uiðfJgÞ5 uið∅Þ5 0.
Suppose that sðxÞ and sðJÞ also have trades x^ and J^ ðwhere sðx^Þ5 sðxÞ
and sðJ^Þ5 sðJÞÞ with another agent j ≠ i. Let the valuations of these
agents be given by
usðxÞðfx^gÞ5 usðxÞðfxgÞ5 usðxÞð∅Þ5 0; usðxÞðfx; x^gÞ5 2`;
usðJÞðfJ^gÞ5 usðJÞðfJgÞ5 usðJÞð∅Þ5 0; usðJÞðfJ; J^gÞ5 2`;
ujðfx^; J^gÞ5 ujðfx^gÞ5 ujðfJ^gÞ5 34 ; ujð∅Þ5 0:
Then in any stable outcome, sðxÞ will sell at most one of x and x^, and sðJÞ
will sell at most one of J and J^. It cannot be that fx; Jg is part of a stable
outcome, as the total price of x and J is at most 1; this means that at
least one of these trades has a price less than or equal to 1=2. Suppose
without loss of generality that pJ ≤ 1=2; we then have that fðJ^; 5=8Þg is
a blocking set. It also cannot be the case that fðx^; px^Þg or fðJ^; pJ^Þg is
stable: in the former case, px^ must be less than 3=4, in which case
fðx; 7=8Þ; ðJ; 1=16Þg is a blocking set. An analogous construction ad-
dresses the latter case.
The proof of theorem 7 essentially generalizes example 2 and can be
found in online Appendix B. As ðfor any preferences, by theorem 5Þ all
22 The proof of this result also shows that, for two-sided markets with transferable utility,
if any agent’s preferences are not fully substitutable, then if there exists at least one other
agent on the same side of the market, simple preferences can be constructed such that no
stable outcome exists.
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competitive equilibria generate stable outcomes and ðby theorem 7Þ sta-
ble outcomes may not exist when preferences are not fully substitutable,
stability and competitive equilibrium 985we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there are at least four agents and that
the set of trades is exhaustive. Then, if the preferences of some agent
are not fully substitutable, there exist simple preferences for all other
agents such that no competitive equilibrium exists.
IV. Other Solution Concepts and FrameworksIn this section, we describe the relationships between competitive equi-
librium, stability, and other solution concepts that have played important
roles in the literature and discuss the connections between our setting
and several earlier frameworks.
A. The Core and Strong Group StabilityWe start by introducing a classical solution concept: the core.
Definition 5. An outcome A is in the core if it is core unblocked: there
does not exist a set of contracts Z such that, for all i ∈ aðZ Þ, UiðZ Þ >
UiðAÞ.
The definition of the core differs from that of stability in two ways.
First, a core block requires all the agents with contracts in the blocking
set to drop their contracts with other agents; this is a more stringent re-
striction than that of stability, which allows agents with contracts in the
blocking set to retain previous relationships. Second, a core block does
not require that Zi ∈ CiðZ [ AÞ for all i ∈ aðZ Þ; rather, it requires only the
less stringent condition that UiðZ Þ > UiðAÞ.
Definition 6. An outcome A is strongly group stable if it is
1. individually rational ;
2. strongly unblocked: there does not exist a nonempty feasible Z ⊆ X
such that
a. Z \ A5 ∅ and
b. for all i ∈ aðZ Þ, there exists a Y i ⊆ Z [ A such that Z ⊆ Y i and
UiðY iÞ > UiðAÞ.
Strong group stability is more stringent than both stability and core
as strong unblockedness ð1Þ allows for the possibility that when consid-
ering a block Z , agents may retain previously held contracts ðas in the
definition of stability, but not in the definition of the coreÞ, and ð2Þ re-
quires only that the new set of contracts for each agent be an improve-
ment ðas in the definition of the core, but not in the definition of stability,
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Strong group stability is more stringent than the strong stability con-
cept of Hatfield and Kominers ð2013aÞ as strong stability imposes the
986 journal of political economyadditional requirement that each Y i must be individually rational. Strong
group stability is also more stringent than the group stability concept intro-
ducedby Roth and Sotomayor ð1990Þ and extended to the setting of many-
to-many matching by Konishi and U¨nver ð2006Þ, as group stability im-
poses the additional requirement that if y ∈ Y bðyÞ, then y ∈ Y sðyÞ, that is,
that the deviating agents agree on the contracts from the original allo-
cation kept after the deviation. Strong stability and group stability them-
selves strengthen the concept of setwise stability introduced by Echenique
and Oviedo ð2006Þ and Klaus and Walzl ð2009Þ, which imposes both of
the above requirements.23
Given these definitions, the following result is immediate.
Theorem 8. Any strongly group stable outcome is stable and in the
core. Furthermore, any core outcome is efficient.
Without additional assumptions on preferences, no additional struc-
ture need be present.24
For models without continuously transferable utility ðsee, e.g., Soto-
mayor 1999; Echenique and Oviedo 2006; Klaus and Walzl 2009; West-
kamp 2010; Hatfield and Kominers 2013aÞ, strong group stability is
strictly more stringent than stability. However, in the presence of con-
tinuously transferable utility and fully substitutable preferences, these so-
lution concepts coincide.
Theorem 9. If preferences are fully substitutable and A is a stable
outcome, then A is strongly group stable and in the core. Moreover, for
any core outcome A, there exists a stable outcome A^ such that tðAÞ5
tðA^Þ.25
B. Competitive Equilibria without Personalized PricesThe competitive equilibrium concept studied in this paper treats trades
as the basic unit of analysis; a price vector specifies one price for each
trade. For example, if agent i has one object to sell, a competitive equi-
librium price vector generally specifies a different price for each possible
buyer, allowing for personalized pricing. Personalized prices arise natu-
23 The setwise stability concept used in these works is slightly stronger than the definition
of setwise stability introduced by Sotomayor ð1999Þ; Klaus and Walzl ð2009Þ discuss the
subtle differences between these two definitions.
24 In online App. B, we present examples showing ðiÞ that it may be the case that both
stable and core outcomes exist for a given set of preferences, while no outcome is both
stable and in the core, and ðiiÞ an outcome that is both stable and in the core need not be
strongly group stable.
25 This result is in a sense sharp: In online App. B, we present an example that shows that
even for fully substitutable preferences, the core may be strictly larger than the set of stable
outcomes.
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rally in decentralized markets, reflecting the idea that agents have access
to different trading opportunities.
stability and competitive equilibrium 987By contrast, for markets in which all trading opportunities can be
thought of as being universally available, it is natural to assume that the
identity of the trading partner is irrelevant; in that case, the convention
is to study notions of competitive equilibrium that assign a single, uni-
form price to each object ðsee, e.g., Gul and Stacchetti 1999; Sun and
Yang 2006Þ. Our next result shows that the standard uniform pricing
model studied in the prior literature embeds into our model.
Definition 7. Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ I .
1. The trades in some set W ⊆ Qi are mutually incompatible for i if for
all Y ⊆ Qi such that jY \Wj ≥ 2, uiðYÞ5 2`.
2. The trades in some set W ⊆ Qi are perfect substitutes for i if for all
Y ⊆ Qi =W and all q, q0 ∈W, uiðY [ fqgÞ5 uiðY [ fq0gÞ.
Theorem 10. Suppose that agents’ preferences are fully substitut-
able. Suppose further that for agent i, trades in W ⊆ Qi are mutually
incompatible and perfect substitutes, and let ½Y; p be an arbitrary com-
petitive equilibrium.
a. If W ⊆ Qi→, define q by qJ 5 maxx∈W px for all J ∈W and qJ 5 pJ for
all J ∈ Q =W. Then ½Y; q is a competitive equilibrium.
b. If W ⊆ Q→i , define q by qJ 5 minx∈W px for all J ∈W and qJ 5 pJ for
all J ∈ Q =W. Then ½Y; q is a competitive equilibrium.
As the preferences of agent i are fully substitutable, a trade q ∈ Qi→
cannot perfectly substitute for a trade q0 ∈ Q→i . Hence, the two cases in
the theorem are exhaustive.
This result allows us to embed the more standard competitive equi-
librium frameworks of Gul and Stacchetti ð1999Þ and Sun and Yang ð2006Þ
as special cases of ourmodel. Inaneconomy in the senseof Sunand Yang,
a finite set S of indivisible objects needs to be allocated among a finite
set J of agents with quasi-linear utilities. Objects are partitioned into two
groups, S1 and S 2. Agents’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes and com-
plements ðGSCÞ condition: Objects in the same group are substitutes and
objects belonging to different groups are complements. The setting of
Gul and Stacchetti can be interpreted as the special case in which S2 5 ∅.
To embed a Sun and Yang economy into our model, one can view each
object in S1 as an agent who can “sell” trades to agents in J and each object
in S2 as an agent who can “buy” trades from agents in J.26 Each agent in
26 Thus, the set I of agents in the constructed economy is equal to J [ S1 [ S2. The set of
1 2 1possible trades Q consists of jS j  j J j1 j J j  jS j trades: those in which agents in S are
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S 5 S1 [ S2 has reservation utility of 0 from not trading, is allowed to
form at most one contract, and cares only about the price of that con-
988 journal of political economytract.27 Agents in J can form multiple contracts, and the valuation uj of
agent j ∈ J from a set of trades with agents in set S ⊆ S1 [ S2 is equal to
the valuation of agent j in the original economy from the set of objects
S. Note that an agent j forming a contract with agent o ∈ S1 at price p in
the network economy corresponds to agent j buying object o at price p
in the original economy, while agent j forming a contract with agent
o ∈ S2 at price p corresponds to agent j buying object o at price2p in the
original economy. With this embedding, GSC in the original economy is
equivalent to full substitutability in the network economy, and thus all our
results apply immediately. Since, for every agent in S, all trades are mu-
tually incompatible and are perfect substitutes, theorem 1 and theorem 10
together imply the existence result of Sun and Yang for uniform-price
competitive equilibria. Note also that this embedding makes it trans-
parent why the construction of Sun and Yang works for markets with
two groups of complementary goods but does not work for markets with
three or more groups: the former case can be reinterpreted in our frame-
work by making one group of objects “sellers” in the market and the
other group of objects “buyers,” while the latter case cannot.
C. Relation to Previous ModelsIn this subsection, we discuss how our model extends the frameworks
considered in the earlier literature. To make the discussion concrete, we
focus on the used car market example we discussed in the introduction
and Section II.B.
First, recall that the set of possible trades among dealers can contain
cycles. Because of this possibility, such a market cannot be modeled us-
ing the vertical supply chain matching framework of Ostrovsky ð2008Þ,
which explicitly rules out cycles. More generally, if the set of contractual
opportunities is finite, that is, if prices are not allowed to vary continu-
ously, as in the frameworks of Ostrovsky ð2008Þ and Hatfield and Komi-
ners ð2012Þ, stable outcomesmay fail to exist when cycles are present ðsee
Hatfield and Kominers 2012, theorem 5Þ. Thus, the earlier models of
matching in networks are not suitable for studying markets such as the
used car market, in which horizontal trading relationships are allowed.
sellers and agents in J are buyers and those in which agents in J are sellers and agents in S227 Thus, agents in S1 will be willing to participate only in contracts with nonnegative
prices, while agents in S2 will be willing to participate only in contracts with nonposi-
tive prices. In any equilibrium, all prices paid by agents in J to agents in S1 will be nonnega-
tive, while all prices “paid” by agents in S2 to agents in J will be nonpositive.
are buyers. Each pair ð j ; oÞ ∈ J  ðS1 [ S2Þ is involved in exactly one possible trade in Q, and
so we can identify the set Q with the set J  ðS1 [ S2Þ.
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Second, note that used cars can be traded directly from a seller to a
buyer as well as indirectly through a dealer. Because of this possibility,
stability and competitive equilibrium 989such a market cannot be modeled using the framework of Sun and Yang
ð2006Þ. To see this, consider the following example. The market consists
of one seller, i, one dealer, j, and one buyer, k. The set Q of possible trades
consists of three trades: trade qi→j from seller i to dealer j, trade qi→k from
seller i to buyer k, and trade qj→k from dealer j to buyer k. The seller i
cares only about the price he receives for the car. The dealer j cares only
about the difference between the price he has to pay i to acquire the car
and the price at which he can resell the car to k. The buyer k cares about
the quality of the car and additional services provided by the dealer
and the price he has to pay. All agents’ preferences are fully substitutable
and thus satisfy the conditions of our model. However, there is no par-
tition of the three trades into two groups such that all agents view trades
in the same group as substitutes and trades in different groups as com-
plements, as required by Sun and Yang. To see this, suppose that there
exists such a partition Q5 Q1 [ Q2. From the perspective of i, selling the
car to j ðtrade qi→jÞ is a substitute for selling the car to k ðtrade qi→kÞ.
Therefore, these two trades have to be in the same element of the par-
tition; without loss of generality, suppose that element is Q1. Similarly,
since for k buying from j ðtrade qj→kÞ is a substitute for buying from i
ðtrade qi→kÞ, these two trades also have to be in the same element of the
partition. Hence, Q1 5 Q and Q2 5 ∅. But then the GSC condition of Sun
and Yang requires dealer j to view trades qi→j and qj→k as substitutes,
violating the assumptions of the example. Thus, in order to model the
used car market ðor other intermediated marketsÞ in Sun and Yang’s
framework, one would have to either rule out intermediated trade
through dealers or exclude direct trade between individual sellers and
buyers.
Finally, note that features such as the presence of cycles and the
possibility of intermediated trade make the frameworks of Kelso and
Crawford ð1982Þ, Bikhchandani and Mamer ð1997Þ, and Gul and Stac-
chetti ð1999Þ inapplicable to the analysis of the used car market and
other markets with those features. Furthermore, Kelso and Crawford
assume that every firm finds every set of workers acceptable, and, anal-
ogously, Bikhchandani and Mamer and Gul and Stacchetti assume that
all possible bundles of trades are acceptable to every agent ðat least at
sufficiently low pricesÞ. By contrast, by allowing the valuations of bun-
dles of trades to take the value 2`, our framework makes it possible to
incorporate production feasibility constraints. Of course, a key construc-
tion in our existence proof, just as in the proof of the existence result of
Sun and Yang ð2006Þ, is the reduction from our richer setting to Kelso
and Crawford’s framework, with suitable modifications and adaptations.
Hence, while the results and techniques of these earlier papers are notThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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directly applicable to our framework, they play an important role in our
analysis of matching in trading networks.
990 journal of political economyV. ConclusionWe have introduced a general model in which a network of agents can
trade via bilateral contracts. In this setting, when continuous transfers
are allowed and agents’ preferences are quasi-linear, full substitutability
of preferences is sufficient and ðin the maximal domain senseÞ necessary
for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes. Furthermore, full sub-
stitutability implies that the set of stable outcomes is equivalent to the
set of competitive equilibria and that all stable outcomes are in the core
and are efficient.
Viewing these results in light of the previous matching literature leads
to two additional observations.
First, stability may be a natural extension of the notion of competitive
equilibrium for some economically important settings in which compet-
itive equilibria do not exist. If the underlying network structure of a mar-
ket does not contain cycles, then stable outcomes exist even if there are
restrictions on the contracts that agents are allowed to form, as long as
agents’ preferences are fully substitutable ðOstrovsky 2008Þ. For instance, a
price floor ðor ceilingÞ may prevent markets from clearing and thus lead
to the nonexistence of competitive equilibria. When studying a market
for a single good, the classical supply-demand diagram may be sufficient
for reasoning about the effects of the price floor. However, in more com-
plicated cases, such as supply chain networks or two-sided markets with
multiple goods, a simple diagram is no longer sufficient. The results of
this paper suggest that stability may be an appropriate extension of com-
petitive equilibrium for those cases: When contractual arrangements are
not restricted, the notions of stability and competitive equilibrium are
equivalent, while when contracting restrictions exist, stability continues to
make predictions. Recent evidence suggests that these predictions are ex-
perimentally supported in multigood markets in which competitive equi-
libria do not exist when price floors are present ðHatfield, Plott, and Ta-
naka 2012a, 2012bÞ.
Second, contrasting our results for general networks with previous find-
ings presents a puzzle. Typically, in the matching literature, there are
strong parallels between the existence and properties of stable outcomes
in markets with fully transferable utility and those in which transfers ei-
ther are not allowed or are restricted. ðThis similarity was first observed
by Shapley and Shubik ½1971 for the basic one-to-one matching model
and continues to hold for increasingly complex environments, up to the
case of vertical networks.Þ Our results show that this relationship breaksThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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down for networks with cycles ðin which agents’ preferences are fully
substitutableÞ: with continuous transfers, stable outcomes are guaran-
stability and competitive equilibrium 991teed to exist, while without them, the set of stable outcomesmay be empty
ðHatfield andKominers 2012Þ. It is an open questionwhy the presence of a
continuous numeraire can replace the assumption of supply chain struc-
ture in ensuring the existence of stable outcomes in trading networks.
Appendix AProof of Proposition 1
Consider a dealer d, a set of trades F in which d can be involved as a buyer, and
a set of trades W in which d can be involved as a seller. For every trade J ∈ F and
trade w ∈W, dealer d knows whether J and w are compatible. The payoff of dealer
d from a feasible set of contracts ðtrades and associated pricesÞ is as given in Sec-
tion II.B.
We first introduce an auxiliary definition. We say that a set of contracts Y ⊆ Xd
is generic if ðaÞ it is finite ði.e., it contains a finite number of elementsÞ and ðbÞ for
every subset Y 0 ⊆ Y, jCdðY 0Þj5 1 ði.e., the choice of d from any subset of Y is
single-valuedÞ. For a generic set of contracts Y, we denote by Y * the ðuniqueÞ
choice of d from Y.
Next, we prove the following lemma ðby induction on mÞ.
Lemma A.1. For every positive integer m,
1. for all generic sets of contracts Y, Z ⊆ Xd such that jY j1 15 jZ j ≤ m,
Yd→ 5 Zd→, and Y→d ⊊ Z→d , we have Y→d =Y *→d ⊆ Z→d =Z *→d and Y *d→ ⊆ Z *d→;
2. for all generic sets of contracts Y, Z ⊆ Xd such that jY j1 15 jZ j ≤ m,
Y→d 5 Z→d , and Yd→ ⊊ Zd→, we have Yd→ =Y *d→ ⊆ Zd→ =Z *d→ and Y *→d ⊆ Z *→d .
In other words, the lemma says that the choice function of a dealer satisfies
the requirements of the full substitutability condition when applied to generic
sets of size at most m and just one new contract is added to the choice set.
Proof. For m 5 1, statements 1 and 2 are both clearly true since both Y * and
Z * are empty.
Suppose that statements 1 and 2 are true for all m ≤ k. We prove them for
m 5 k 1 1. Specifically, we prove statement 2; the proof of statement 1 is com-
pletely analogous.
Consider sets Y and Z satisfying the conditions of statement 2. ðIn the lan-
guage of the used car example, Z has one additional request for a used car rela-
tive to Y, and both sets contain the same offers of cars.Þ If Y * 5 Z * ði.e., the opti-
mal choice of dealer d is unaffected by the new requestÞ, then the conclusion of
statement 2 is clearly true.
Otherwise ði.e., if Y * ≠ Z *Þ, let ðw; pwÞ be the new request in Z ði.e., the unique
element in Z =Y Þ. It must be the case that ðw; pwÞ ∈ Z * ðbecause otherwise this new
request could not have affected the optimal choice of dÞ.
We now consider two cases: ð1Þ Y * contains a contract that involves trade w at
some price p 0
w
≠ pw and ð2Þ Y * does not contain such a contract.This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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Case 1: It must be the case that p 0
w
< pw, as if p 0w > pw, then request ðw; pwÞ is
never chosen by dealer d when ðw; p 0
w
Þ is also available. If, when choosing from Z,
992 journal of political economydealer d simply replaces ðw; p 0
w
Þ in Y * with ðw; pwÞ, his payoff goes up by pw 2 p 0w
ðrelative to that from Y *Þ. Note that there cannot be a subset of Z containing
ðw; pwÞ that gives dealer d a strictly higher payoff than that because otherwise
replacing ðw; pwÞ in that subset with ðw; p 0wÞ would result in a subset of Y that gives
dealer d a higher payoff than Y *. Finally, since, by assumption, sets Y and Z are
generic, all choice functions are single-valued, and thus we must have
Z * 5 ðY * =fðw; p0
w
ÞgÞ [ fðw; pwÞg:
It is now immediate that the conclusion of statement 2 holds.
Case 2: Consider the input contract ðJ; pJÞ to which request ðw; pwÞ is matched
when d is choosing from Z. If ðJ; pJÞ ∉ Y * ði.e., the car to which request w is
matched was not involved in the optimal choice from set Y Þ, then it must be the
case that the remaining matches are unaffected; hence,
Z * 5 Y * [ fðJ; pJÞg [ fðw; pwÞg;
and the conclusion of statement 2 holds.
Suppose instead that ðJ; qJÞ was matched to some request when dealer d was
choosing from Y. ðThis subcase is the heart of the proof of lemma A.1 and
proposition 1; this is the part that relies on the use of the inductive hypothesis.Þ
Let W * be the choice of dealer d from set W 5 Y =fðJ; pJÞg. Crucially, it must be
the case that Z * 5W * [ fðJ; pJÞg [ fðw; pwÞg: by assumption, in the optimal
choice Z *, contract ðJ; pJÞ is matched to request ðw; pwÞ, and thus the remaining
chosen contracts are simply those that maximize the payoff of dealer d when
choosing from the remaining set of options, Y =fðJ; pJÞg. Now, we can apply the
inductive hypothesis to sets W and Y ðwhich are, respectively, one element
smaller than sets Y and Z Þ. By statement 1 of the inductive hypothesis ðwhich is
now the relevant statementÞ, W→d =W *→d ⊆ Y→d =Y *→d and W *d→ ⊆ Y *d→. Combining
these two set inclusions with the relationships identified above, we now have
Y *→d 5 Y→d =ðY→d =Y *→dÞ ⊆ Y→d =ðW→d =W *→dÞ5W *→d [ fðJ; pJÞg5 Z *→d
and
Yd→ =Y *d→ 5Wd→ =Y
*
d→ ⊆Wd→ =W *d→ 5 Zd→ =Z *d→;
concluding the proof of lemma A.1. QED
We now use lemma A.1 to prove that the preferences of dealer d are fully
substitutable. Consider dealer d and sets Y, Z ⊆ Xd satisfying the assumptions of
part 2 of definition 1. ðThe proof for part 1 is completely analogous.Þ Let Y^
5 Y \ ðY * [ Z *Þ and Z^ 5 Z \ ðY * [ Z *Þ; that is, Y^ and Z^ are the subsets of Y and
Z that contain all possible contracts relevant for choices of d from Y and Z.
Clearly, Y^→d 5 Z^→d , Y^d→ ⊆ Z^d→, and sets Y^ and Z^ are finite and inherit the property
of Y and Z that the choices of d from those sets are single-valued ðand those
choices are Y * and Z *, respectivelyÞ. Sets Y^ and Z^ are not necessarily generic;This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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however, we can slightly perturb prices in contracts in Y^ and Z^ in such a way that
the resulting sets ~Y and ~Z are generic, the relationships ~Y →d 5 ~Z→d and ~Y d→ ⊆ ~Z d→
stability and competitive equilibrium 993are preserved, and the optimal choices of dealer d from those sets, ~Y * and ~Z *, are
the perturbed original choices Y * and Z * ði.e., they involve the same trades, along
with the perturbed pricesÞ.28
We now show that ~Y d→ =~Y *d→ ⊆ ~Zd→ =~Z
*
d→ and ~Y
*
→d ⊆ ~Z
*
→d , which imply the same
relationships for sets Y^, Z^, Y *, and Z *, which in turn imply the same relationships
for sets Y, Z, Y *, and Z *, and those relationships are precisely the conclusions in
part 2 of definition 1 that we need to prove.
If ~Y 5 ~Z , then it is immediate that ~Y d→ =~Y *d→ ⊆ ~Z d→ =~Z
*
d→ and ~Y
*
→d ⊆ ~Z
*
→d . Oth-
erwise, let n 5 j~Z =~Y j and consider an increasing sequence of sets
~Y 5Y 0 ⊊ Y 1 ⊊    ⊊ Y n 5 ~Z ;
in which each set contains exactly one extra contract relative to the previous set
in the sequence. By lemma A.1, for every l 5 0; : : : ;n 2 1, we have Y ld→ =Y
l ;*
d→ ⊆
Y l11d→ =Y
l11;*
d→ and Y
l ;*
→d ⊆ Y
l11;*
→d . This implies that ~Y d→ =~Y *d→ 5 Y
0
d→ =Y
0;*
d→ ⊆ Y
n
d→ =Y
n;*
d→ 5
~Zd→ =~Z *d→ and ~Y
*
→d 5 Y
0;*
→d ⊆ Y
n;*
→d 5 ~Z *→d .
Proof of Theorem 1The proof consists of four steps: ð1Þ transforming the original valuations into
bounded ones, ð2Þ constructing a two-sided many-to-one matching market with
transfers based on the network market with bounded valuations, ð3Þ picking a
full-employment competitive equilibrium in the two-sided market, and ð4Þ using
that equilibrium to construct a competitive equilibrium in the original market.
Throughout the proof, we will refer to valuation functions and utility functions that
give rise to fully substitutable preferences as fully substitutable.
Step 1: We first transform a fully substitutable but potentially unbounded from
below valuation function ui into a fully substitutable and bounded valuation func-
tion u^i . For this purpose, we now introduce a very high price P. Specifically, for
28 To formally construct such a perturbation, let D be the smallest positive difference
^ ^between the utilities of dealer d from two different feasible subsets of Z . Let f 5 jZ j.
Randomly order contracts in Z^ , and add D=2 to the price in the first contract, D=4 to the
price in the second contract, . . . , D=2f to the price in the last contract. Let ~Z be the resulting
set of contracts with perturbed prices. Since Y^ is a subset of Z^ ðand ~Y must be a subset of ~Z Þ,
prices in the perturbed set ~Y are automatically pinned down. To see that set ~Z is generic,
consider any two distinct sets ~Z
1
, ~Z
2 ⊆ ~Z such that Udð~Z 1Þ > 2` and Udð~Z 2Þ > 2`, and also
consider the corresponding distinct sets Z^ 1, Z^ 2 ⊆ Z^ ðthe utilities from which are therefore
also finiteÞ. IfUdðZ^ 1Þ ≠ UdðZ^ 2Þ, then by construction jUdðZ^ 1Þ 2 UdðZ^ 2Þj ≥ D, and thus we also
have Udð~Z 1Þ ≠ Udð~Z 2Þ because, by construction, the sum of perturbations of any set of prices
is less than or equal to ofl51D=2l , which is strictly less than D. If UdðZ^ 1Þ5 UdðZ^ 2Þ, then, since
the two sets are distinct, it must also be the case that Udð~Z 1Þ ≠ Udð~Z 2Þ. To see that, consider
the first contract ðaccording to the random order constructed above, using which the per-
turbations were constructedÞ that belongs to one of these sets but not to the other, and
consider the size of its perturbation. Again, by construction, any sum of the remaining per-
turbations is less than this first one, and thus Udð~Z 1Þ ≠ Udð~Z 2Þ. Hence, no two subsets of ~Z
give the same finite utility to dealer d, which implies that ~Z is generic, as required. Since
~Y ⊆ ~Z , it immediately follows that set ~Y is also generic. Note that the above argument also
implies that, as required, the optimal choices of dealer d from sets ~Y and ~Z are the perturbed
optimal choices of dealer d from sets Y^ and Z^ , respectively.
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each agent i, let ui be the highest possible absolute valuation of agent i from a com-
bination of trades, that is, ui 5 maxfW⊆Qi :jui ðWÞj<`g juiðWÞj. Then set P5 2oi∈I ui 1 1.
994 journal of political economyConsider the following modified economy. Assume that for every trade, the buyer of
that trade can always purchase a perfect substitute for that trade for P and the
seller of that trade can always produce this trade at the cost of P with no inputs
needed. Formally, for each agent i, for a set of trades W ⊆ Qi , let
u^iðWÞ5 max
W
0⊆W
½uiðW0Þ2 P  jW =W0j:
For the economy with valuations u^i , let U^i denote the utility function of agent i
and let D^i denote the resulting demand correspondence. Note that by the choice
of P, for any W ⊆ Qi,
ui ≥ u^iðWÞ ≥maxfuið∅Þ2 P  jWj; uiðWÞg
and that u^iðWÞ5 uiðWÞ whenever uiðWÞ ≠ 2`. We use these facts throughout the
proof.
The rest of step 1 consists of proving the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. The utility function U^i is fully substitutable.
Proof. Takeany fully substitutable valuation functionui . Take any trade J ∈ Qi→.
Consider a modified valuation function uJi :
uJi ðWÞ5maxfuiðWÞ; uiðW =fJgÞ2 Pg:
That is, this valuation function allows ðbut does not requireÞ agent i to pay P
instead of forming one particular trade, J. With this definition, the valuation
function uJi is fully substitutable.
To see this, consider utility U Ji and demand D
J
i corresponding to valuation u
J
i .
We show that DJi satisfies the IFS condition of Hatfield et al. ð2013Þ, one of the
equivalent definitions of full substitutability.29 Fix two price vectors p and p 0 such
that p ≤ p 0 and jDJi ðpÞj5 jDJi ðp 0Þj5 1. Take W ∈ DJi ðpÞ and W0 ∈ DJi ðp 0Þ. We need to
show that for all q ∈ Qi such that pq 5 p 0q, eqðWÞ ≤ eqðW0Þ.
Let price vector q coincide with p for all trades other than J, and set qJ 5
minfpJ;Pg. Note that if pJ < P, then p 5 q and DJi ðpÞ5 DiðpÞ. If pJ > P, then
under utility U Ji , agent i always wants to form trade J at price pJ, and the only
decision is whether to “buy it out” or not at the costP; that is, the agent’s effective
demand is the same as under price vector q. Thus, DJi ðpÞ5 fY [ fJg : Y ∈ DiðqÞg.
Finally, if pJ 5 P, then p 5 q and DJi ðpÞ5 DiðpÞ[fY [ fJg : Y ∈ DiðpÞg. Construct
price vector q 0 corresponding to p 0 analogously.
Now, if pJ ≤ p 0J < P, then DJi ðpÞ5 DiðpÞ, DJi ðp 0Þ5 Diðp 0Þ, and thus eqðWÞ ≤ eqðW 0Þ
follows directly from the IFS condition for demand Di .
29 The definition of the IFS condition is as follows. For agent i and any set of trades
W ⊆ Qi , define the ðgeneralizedÞ indicator function eðWÞ ∈ f21; 0; 1gjQi j to be the vector with
component eqðWÞ5 1 for each upstream trade q ∈W→i , eqðWÞ5 21 for each downstream
trade q ∈Wi→, and eqðWÞ5 0 for each trade q ∉W. ðThe interpretation of eðWÞ is that an
agent buys a strictly positive amount of a good if he is the buyer in a trade inW and “buys” a
strictly negative amount if he is the seller of such a trade.Þ Then we say that the prefer-
ences of agent i are indicator-language fully substitutable ðIFSÞ if for all price vectors p, p 0 ∈ RjQj
such that jDiðpÞj5 jDiðp 0Þj5 1 and p ≤ p 0, for the uniqueW ∈ DiðpÞ andW 0 ∈ Diðp 0Þ, we have
eqðWÞ ≤ eqðW 0Þ for each q ∈ Qi such that pq 5 p 0q.
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If P ≤ pJ ≤ p 0J, then ðsince we assumed that DJi was single-valued at p and p 0Þ it
has to be the case that Di is single-valued at the corresponding price vectors q
stability and competitive equilibrium 995and q 0. Let Y ∈ DiðqÞ and Y0 ∈ Diðq 0Þ. Then W5 Y [ fJg, W0 5 Y0 [ fJg, and the
statement follows from the IFS condition for demand Di because q ≤ q 0.
Finally, if pJ < P ≤ p 0J, then p 5 q, W is the unique element in DiðpÞ, and W 0
5 Y0 [ fJg, where Y0 is the unique element in Diðq 0Þ. Then for q ≠ J, the state-
ment follows from IFS for demand Di because p ≤ q 0. For q5 J, the statement
does not need to be checked because pJ < p 0J.
Thus, when J ∈ Qi→, the valuation function uJi is fully substitutable. The proof
for the case when J ∈ Q→i is completely analogous.
To complete the proof of the lemma, it is now enough to note that valuation
function u^iðWÞ5 maxW 0⊆W½uiðW 0Þ2 P  jW =W0j can be obtained from the original
valuation ui by allowing agent i to “buy out” all of his trades, one by one, and
since the preceding argument shows that each such transformation preserves
substitutability, u^i is substitutable as well. QED
Step 2: We now transform the modified economy with bounded and fully
substitutable valuations u^i into an associated two-sided many-to-one matching
market with transfers, which satisfies the assumptions of Kelso and Crawford
ð1982Þ. The set of firms in this market is I, and the set of workers is Q.
Worker q can be matched to at most one firm. His utility is defined as follows:
If he is matched to firm i ∈ fbðqÞ; sðqÞg, then his utility is equal to the monetary
transfer that he receives from that firm, that is, his salary pi;q, which can in prin-
ciple be negative. If he is matched to any other firm i, his utility is equal to 2 P
2 11 pi;q, where P is as defined in step 1 and pi;q is the salary firm i pays him. If
worker q remains unmatched, his utility is equal to 2 2P2 2.
Firm i can be matched to any set of workers, but only its matches to workers
q ∈ Qi have an impact on its valuation. Formally, the valuation of firm i from
hiring a set of workers W ⊆ Q is given by
~uiðWÞ5 u^iðW→i [ ðQ =WÞi→Þ2 u^iðQi→Þ;
where the second term in the difference is simply a constant, which ensures that
~uið∅Þ5 0, so that valuation function ~ui satisfies the NFL assumption of Kelso
and Crawford. Hiring a set of workers W ⊆ Q when the salary vector is p ∈ RjI jjQj
yields i a utility of
~U ið½W; pÞ; ~uiðWiÞ2 o
q∈W
pi;q:
The associated demand correspondence is denoted by
~Di ; arg max
W⊆Qi
~U ið½W; pÞ:
The MP assumption of Kelso and Crawford requires that any firm’s change
in valuation from adding a worker, q, to any set of other workers is at least as large
as the lowest salary worker q would be willing to accept from the firm when his
only alternative is to remain unmatched. This assumption is also satisfied in ourThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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market: A worker’s utility from remaining unmatched is22P2 2, while his val-
uation, excluding salary, from matching with any firm is at least 2P2 1, and
996 journal of political economyso he would strictly prefer to work for any firm for negative salary 2P instead
of remaining unmatched. At the same time, the change in valuation of any firm
i from adding worker q to a set of workers W is equal to ~uiðW [ fqgÞ2 ~uiðWÞ
≥ 2 ui 2 ui > 2P, and thus every firm i would also always strictly prefer to hire
worker q for the negative salary 2P.
Finally, we show that the preferences of i in this market satisfy the gross sub-
stitutes ðGSÞ condition of Kelso and Crawford. Take two salary vectors p, p 0 ∈
RjI jjQj such that p ≤ p 0 and j~DiðpÞj5 j~Diðp 0Þj5 1. Let W ∈ ~DiðpÞ and W0 ∈ ~Diðp 0Þ.
Denote by q 5 ðpi;qÞq∈Q and q 0 5 ðp 0i;qÞq∈Q the vectors of salaries that i faces under
p and p 0, respectively. Note that W ∈ ~DiðpÞ if and only if W→i [ ðQ =WÞi→ ∈ D^iðqÞ
and W 0 ∈ ~Diðp 0Þ if and only if W0→i [ ðQ =W0Þi→ ∈ D^iðq 0Þ. In particular, jD^iðqÞj5
jD^iðq 0Þj5 1. Since q ≤ q 0 and D^i is fully substitutable, the IFS condition implies
that for any q ∈W→i such that qq 5 q 0q, we have q ∈W
0
→i , and for any q ∉ Qi→ =Wi→
such that qq 5 q 0q, we have q ∉ Qi→ =W
0
i→. In other words, for every q ∈W such that
qq 5 q 0q, we have q ∈W 0, and thus the GS condition is satisfied for all salary vectors
for which demand ~Di is single-valued. As shown by Hatfield et al. ð2013Þ, this im-
plies that the GS condition is satisfied for all salary vectors.
Step 3: By the results of Kelso and Crawford ðtheorem 2 and the discussion in
Sec. IIÞ, there exists a full-employment competitive equilibrium of the associated
two-sided market constructed in step 2. Take one such equilibrium, and for every
q and i, let mðqÞ denote the firm matched to q in this equilibrium and let ri;q
denote the equilibrium salary of q at i.
Note that in this equilibrium, it must be the case that every worker q is
matched to either bðqÞ or sðqÞ. Indeed, suppose that q is matched to some other
firm i ∉ fbðqÞ; sðqÞg. Since by definition, for anyW ⊆ Q, ~uiðW [ fqgÞ2 ~uiðWÞ5 0,
it must be the case that ri;q ≤ 0. Then, for worker q to weakly prefer to work for
i rather than bðqÞ, it must be the case that rbðqÞ;q ≤ 2P2 1. But at that salary,
firm bðqÞ strictly prefers to hire q, contradicting the assumption that q is not
matched to bðqÞ in this equilibrium.
Note also that if mðqÞ5 bðqÞ, then rbðqÞ;q ≥ rsðqÞ;q, and if mðqÞ5 sðqÞ, then rsðqÞ;q
≥ rbðqÞ;q ðotherwise, worker q would strictly prefer to change his employerÞ. Now,
define prices pi;q as follows: if i ≠ bðqÞ and i ≠ sðqÞ, then pi;q 5 ri;q. Otherwise,
pi;q 5maxfrbðqÞ;q; rsðqÞ;qg. Note that matching m and associated prices pi;q also con-
stitute a competitive equilibrium of the two-sided market.
Step 4: We can now construct a competitive equilibrium for the original econ-
omy. Let p* ∈ RjQj be defined as p*
q
; pmðqÞ;q for each q ∈ Q, that is, the salary that
q actually receives in the equilibrium of the two-sided market. Let W* ;
fq ∈ Q : mðqÞ5 bðqÞg, that is, the set of trades/workers who in the equilibrium of
the two-sided market are matched to their buyers ðand thus not matched to their
sellers!Þ.
We now claim that ½W*; p* is a competitive equilibrium of the network econ-
omy with bounded valuations u^i . Take any set of trades W ∈ Qi . We show that
U^ið½W*; p*Þ ≥ U^ið½W; p*Þ. By construction, for any q ∈ Q→i, we have q ∈W* if and
only if i 5 mðqÞ, and for any q ∈ Qi→, we have q ∈W* if and only if i ≠ mðqÞ. Thus,
in the equilibrium of the two-sided market, firm i is matched to the set of work-This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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ers W*→i [ ðQi→ =W*i→Þ, which implies that
stability and competitive equilibrium 997~uiðW*→i [ ðQi→ =W*i→ÞÞ2 o
q∈W*→i
pi;q 2 o
q∈Qi→ =W*i→
pi;q
≥ ~uiðW→i [ ðQi→ =Wi→ÞÞ2 o
q∈W→i
pi;q 2 o
q∈Qi→ =Wi→
pi;q:
ðA1Þ
Now, for any set F ⊆ Qi→, we have
o
q∈Qi→ =F
pi;q 5

o
q∈Qi→
pi;q

2

o
q∈F
pi;q

:
Using this fact and the definition of ~ui , we can rewrite the inequality ðA1Þ as
u^iðW*→i [W*i→Þ2 o
q∈W*→i
pi;q 1 o
q∈W*i→
pi;q
≥ u^iðW→i [Wi→Þ2 o
q∈W→i
pi;q 1 o
q∈Wi→
pi;q;
which in turn can be rewritten as
U^ið½W*; p*Þ5 u^iðW*i Þ2 o
q∈W*→i
p*
q
1 o
q∈W*i→
p*
q
≥ u^iðWÞ2 o
q∈W→i
p*
q
1 o
q∈Wi→
p*
q
5 U^ ð½W; p*Þ:
We now show that ½W*; p* is an equilibrium of the original economy with
valuations ui . Suppose to the contrary that there exist an agent i and a set of
trades Y ⊆ Qi such that Uið½Y; p*Þ > Uið½W*; p*Þ. Since U^ið½Y; p*Þ ≤ U^ið½W*; p*Þ
and, by the construction of u^i , U^ið½Y; p*Þ ≥ Uið½Y; p*Þ, it follows that U^ið½W*; p*Þ
> Uið½W*; p*Þ. This, in turn, implies that for some nonempty set F ⊆W*i , we have
u^iðW*i Þ5 uiðW*i =FÞ2 P  jFj ≤ ui 2 P:
This implies that
o
j ∈I
u^jðW*Þ5 u^iðW*Þ1 o
j ≠ i
u^jðW*Þ
≤ ui 2 P1 o
j ≠ i
uj
5 o
j ∈I
uj 2 P
5 2o
j ∈I
uj 2 1
< o
j ∈I
ujð∅Þ;
contradicting theorem 2. ðThe proof of theorem 2 is entirely self-contained.ÞThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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Proof of Theorem 2
998 journal of political economyIf ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium, then for any Y ⊆ Q, we have
uiðWÞ1 o
q∈Wi→
pq 2 o
q∈W→i
pq 5 Uið½W; pÞ
≥ Uið½Y; pÞ
5 uiðYÞ1 o
q∈Yi→
pq 2 o
q∈Y→i
pq
for every i ∈ I . By summing these inequalities over all i ∈ I , we find that
o
i∈I
uiðWÞ ≥ o
i∈I
uiðYÞ:
Proof of Theorem 3
We use an approach analogous to the one Gul and Stacchetti ð1999Þ use to prove
their lemma 6. Suppose that ½Y; p is a competitive equilibrium and that W ⊆ Q is
an efficient set of trades. Since W is efficient, we have
o
i∈I

uiðWÞ1 o
q∈Wi→
pq 2 o
q∈W→i
pq

5 o
i∈I
Uið½W; pÞ
≥ o
i∈I
Uið½Y; pÞ
5 o
i∈I

uiðYÞ1 o
q∈Yi→
pq 2 o
q∈Y→i
pq

:
ðA2Þ
As ½Y; p is a competitive equilibrium, we have for each i ∈ I that
uiðYÞ1 o
q∈Yi→
pq 2 o
q∈Y→i
pq 5 Uið½Y; pÞ
≥ Uið½W; pÞ
5 uiðWÞ1 o
q∈Wi→
pq 2 o
q∈W→i
pq:
We therefore see that ðA2Þ can hold only if, for each i ∈ I , Uið½Y; pÞ5 Uið½W; pÞ.
Therefore, for all i ∈ I , we have that Wi ∈ DiðpÞ; thus, ½W; p is a competitive equi-
librium.
Proof of Theorem 4Our approach extends the proof of theorem 3 of Sun and Yang ð2009Þ to the
network setting. Given a price vector p, let V ðpÞ;oi∈I ViðpÞ, where ðas defined
in Sec. II.BÞ ViðpÞ; maxW⊆Qi Uið½W; pÞ. Let W* ⊆ Q be any efficient set of trades
and let U * 5oi∈I uiðW*Þ. Note that for any competitive equilibrium price vector
p*, V ðp*Þ5 U *.
We first prove an analogue of lemma 1 of Sun and Yang ð2009Þ.This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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Lemma A.3. A price vector p 0 ∈ RjQj is a competitive equilibrium price vector
if and only if p 0 ∈ argminp V ðpÞ.
stability and competitive equilibrium 999Proof. To prove the first implication of the lemma, we let p 0 be a competitive
equilibrium price vector and let p be an arbitrary price vector. For each agent i,
consider some arbitrary Wi ∈ DiðpÞ. By construction, we have
V ðpÞ5 o
i∈I
ViðpÞ5 o
i∈I

uiðWiÞ1 o
q∈Wii→
pq 2 o
q∈Wi→i
pq

≥ o
i∈I

uiðW*Þ1 o
q∈W*i→
pq 2 o
q∈W*→i
pq

5 o
i∈I
uiðW*Þ5 U * 5 V ðp0Þ;
where the inequality follows from utility maximization. This proves that p 0 ∈
argminp V ðpÞ.
Now, to prove the other implication of the lemma, let p 0 be any price vector
that minimizes V ðand thus satisfies V ðp 0Þ5 U *Þ. We claim that ½W*; p 0 is a
competitive equilibrium. To see this, note that the definition of Vi implies that
Viðp0Þ ≥ uiðW*Þ1 o
q∈W*i→
p0
q
2 o
q∈W*→i
p0
q
: ðA3Þ
Summing ðA3Þ across i ∈ I gives
o
i∈I
Viðp0Þ ≥ o
i∈I

uiðW*Þ1 o
q∈W*i→
p0
q
2 o
q∈W*→i
p0
q

5 o
i∈I
uiðW*Þ5 U *; ðA4Þ
with equality holding exactly when ðA3Þ holds with equality for every i. If ðA3Þ
were strict for any i, we would obtain V ðp 0Þ > U * from ðA4Þ, contradicting the
assumption that p 0 minimizes V ðand thus p 0 satisfies V ðp 0Þ5 U *Þ. Thus, for all i ∈ I ,
equality holds in ðA3Þ, and thus ½W*; p 0 is a competitive equilibrium. QED
Now, suppose that p and q are two competitive equilibrium price vectors, and
let p ∧ q and p ∨ q denote their meet and join, respectively. Note that
2U * ≤ V ðp ∧ qÞ1 V ðp ∨ qÞ
≤ V ðpÞ1 V ðqÞ5 2U *;
where the first inequality follows because ðby lemma A.3Þ U * is the minimal value
of V, the second inequality follows from the submodularity of V ðwhich holds
because each agent’s preferences are fully substitutable, implying that Vi is sub-
modular for every i ∈ I Þ, and the equality follows from lemma A.3 because p and q
are competitive equilibrium price vectors. Since we also know that V ðp ∧ qÞ ≥ U *
and V ðp ∨ qÞ ≥ U *, it has to be the case that V ðp ∧ qÞ5 V ðp ∨ qÞ5 U *, and so by
lemma A.3, p ∧ q and p ∨ q are competitive equilibrium price vectors.This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Proof of Theorem 5
1000 journal of political economyLet A; kð½W; pÞ. Suppose that A is not stable; then either it is not individually
rational or there exists a blocking set.
If A is not individually rational, then Ai ∉ CiðAÞ for some i ∈ I . Hence, Ai ∉
argmaxZ⊆Ai UiðZ Þ, and therefore, tðAiÞ5Wi ∉ DiðpÞ, contradicting the assumption
that ½W; p is a competitive equilibrium.
Suppose now that there exists a set Z blocking A, and let J 5 aðZ Þ be the set
of agents involved in contracts in Z. For any trade q involved in a contract in Z,
let ~p
q
be the price for which ðq; ~p
q
Þ ∈ Z . For each j ∈ J , pick a set Y j ∈ CjðZ [ AÞ.
As Z blocks A, ðby definitionÞ we have Zj ⊆ Y j . Since Z \ A5 ∅ and Zj ⊆ Y for all
Y ∈ CjðZ [ AÞ, we have that Aj ∉ CjðZ [ AÞ. Hence, for all j ∈ J ,
UjðAÞ < UjðY jÞ5 ujðtðY jÞÞ1 o
q∈tðZ Þj→
~p
q
2 o
q∈tðZ Þ→j
~p
q
1 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þj→
pq 2 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þ→j
pq:
Summing these inequalities over all j ∈ J , we have
o
j ∈J
UjðAÞ < o
j ∈J

ujðtðY jÞÞ1 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þj→
pq 2 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þ→j
pq

5 o
j ∈J

ujðtðY jÞÞ1 o
q∈tðZ Þj→
pq 2 o
q∈tðZ Þ→j
pq
1 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þj→
pq 2 o
q∈tðY j =Z Þ→j
pq

5 o
j ∈J

ujðtðY jÞÞ1 o
q∈tðY j Þj→
pq 2 o
q∈tðY j Þ→j
pq

5 o
j ∈J
UjðY jÞ;
where we repeatedly apply the fact that for every trade q in tðZ Þ, the price ðfirst
~p
q
and then pqÞ of this trade is added exactly once and subtracted exactly once in
the summation over all agents.
Now, the preceding inequality says that the sum of the utilities of agents in J
given prices p would be strictly higher if each j ∈ J chose Y j instead of Aj . It
therefore must be the case that for some j ∈ J , we have Ujð½tðY jÞ; pÞ > Ujð½A; pÞ.
It follows that Aj ∉ DjðpÞ; hence, ½W; p cannot be a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6Consider a stable outcome A ⊆ X . For every agent i ∈ I , define a modified valu-
ation function u^i on sets of trades W ⊆ Q =tðAÞ:This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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u^iðWÞ5 max
Y ⊆Ai

uiðW [ tðY ÞÞ1 o pq 2 o pq

:
stability and competitive equilibrium 1001ðq;pqÞ∈Yi→ ðq;pqÞ∈Y→i
In other words, the modified valuation u^iðWÞ of W is equal to the maximal value
attainable by agent i by combining the trades in Wi with various subsets of Ai . We
denote the utility function associated to u^i by U^i. Since the original utilities are
fully substitutable, and thus their demand correspondences Di satisfy the DEFS
condition of Hatfield et al. ð2013Þ, the demand correspondences D^i for utility
functions U^i also satisfy the DEFS condition, and thus every U^i is also fully sub-
stitutable.
Now, consider a modified economy for the set of agents I, in which the set of
trades is Q =tðAÞ, and utilities are given by U^ . If there is a competitive equilibrium
of the modified economy of the form ½∅; p^Q =tðAÞ, that is, involving no trades, then
we are done: We can combine the prices in this competitive equilibrium with the
prices in A to obtain the price vector p as
pq 5
pq if ðq; pÞ ∈ A
p^q otherwise:

It is clear that in this case ½tðAÞ; p is a competitive equilibrium of the original
economy: Since ∅ ∈ D^ið p^Þ for every i, no agent strictly prefers to add trades not
in tðAÞ, and by the individual rationality of A, no agent strictly prefers to drop
any trades in tðAÞ.
Now suppose that there is not a competitive equilibrium of the modified econ-
omy in which no trades occur. By theorem 1, the modified economy has at least
one competitive equilibrium ½W^; p^. By theorems 2 and 3, we know that W^ is effi-
cient and ∅ is not. It follows that
oi∈I u^iðW^Þ2 oi∈I u^ið∅Þ
2jQj1 1 > 0;
we denote this value by d.
Now, we consider a second modification of the valuation functions, obtained
by taking
~uiðWÞ5 u^iðWÞ2 djWi j:
We show next that the utility functions ~U i corresponding to the valuations ~ui are
fully substitutable: Take agent i and any two price vectors p 0 and p 0 0. Construct a
new price vector ~p 0 as follows. For every trade q ∈ Q =tðAÞ, ~p 0
q
5 pq 1 d if bðqÞ5 i,
~p 0
q
5 pq2 d if sðqÞ5 i, and ~p 0q 5 0 if q ∉ Qi . Construct price vector ~p 0 0 analogously,
starting with p 0 0. Note that for any set of trades W ⊆ Q =tðAÞ, we have ~U ið½W; p 0Þ5
U^ið½W; ~p 0Þ and ~U ið½W; p 0 0Þ5 U^ið½W; ~p 0 0Þ, and therefore, for the corresponding in-
direct utility functions, we have ~V iðp 0Þ5 V^ið~p 0Þ and ~V iðp 00Þ5 V^ið~p 0 0Þ.
Now, by the submodularity of V^i ðwhich follows from the full substitutability
of U^iÞ, we haveThis content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
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V^ið~p0 ∧ ~p00Þ1 V^ið~p0 ∨ ~p00Þ ≤ V^ið~p0Þ1 V^ið~p00Þ;
1002 journal of political economyand therefore,
~V iðp0 ∧ p00Þ1 ~V iðp0 ∨ p00Þ ≤ ~V iðp0Þ1 ~V iðp00Þ:
Hence, ~V i is submodular, and therefore, ~U i is fully substitutable.
Now, by our choice of d, we have oi∈I ~uiðW^Þ >oi∈I ~uið∅Þ. Thus, ∅ is not effi-
cient under the valuations ~u and therefore cannot be supported in a competitive
equilibrium under those valuations. Take any competitive equilibrium ½~W; q of
the economy with agents I, trades Q =tðAÞ, and utilities ~U . We know that ~W ≠ ∅.
Moreover, since ~Wi ∈ ~DiðqÞ for every i ðwhere ~Di is the demand correspondence
induced by ~U iÞ, we know that for any F ⊊ ~Wi, ~U ið½~Wi ; qÞ ≥ ~U ið½F; qÞ, and thus
U^ið½~Wi ; qÞ > U^ið½F; qÞ. This then implies that for all i, in the original economy
with trades Q and utility functions Ui , the set of trades fðw; qwÞ : w ∈ ~Wig is a subset
of every Y ∈ CiðA [ fðw; qwÞ : w ∈ ~WigÞ. Thus, fðw; qwÞ : w ∈ ~Wg is a blocking set
for A, contradicting the assumption that A is stable.
Proof of Theorem 9Suppose that A is a stable outcome. By theorem 6, there is a vector of prices p
such that ½tðAÞ; p is a competitive equilibrium. Now note that the second part of
the proof of theorem 5 actually shows that any outcome associated with a com-
petitive equilibrium, in particular A, is strongly group stable.
To see that for any core outcome A there is a stable outcome A^ such that
tðAÞ5 tðA^Þ, note that, by theorem 8, every core outcome A has an efficient set of
trades tðAÞ. By theorem 3, we can find a competitive equilibrium corresponding
to any efficient set of trades, in particular, tðAÞ. Finally, by theorem 5, this com-
petitive equilibrium induces a stable outcome.
Proof of Theorem 10We prove part a; the proof of part b is completely analogous.
First, we show that Y ∈ DiðqÞ. Note that jYi \Wj ∈ f0; 1g by mutual incompat-
ibility of the trades in W. If Yi \W5 ∅, then let y ∈ argmaxw∈W pw. Now consider
F ∈ DiðqÞ. As jFi \Wj ∈ f0; 1g by mutual incompatibility of the trades in W, there
are two subcases to consider: If Fi \W5 ∅, then
Uið½F; qÞ5 Uið½F; pÞ ≤ Uið½Y; pÞ5 Uið½Y; qÞ;
where the first step follows from qQ =W 5 pQ =W, the second step follows from the
optimality of Yi at prices p, and the third step follows from qQ =W 5 pQ =W; hence,
Y ∈ DiðqÞ. Alternatively, if Fi \W5 fJg, then
Uið½F; qÞ5 Uið½ðF =fJgÞ [ fyg; qÞ5 Uið½ðF =fJgÞ [ fyg; pÞ
≤ Uið½Y; pÞ5 Uið½Y; qÞ;This content downloaded from 138.251.162.207 on Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:58:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
where the first step follows from perfect substitutability of the trades in W, the
second step follows from the facts that py 5 qy and qQ =W 5 pQ =W, the third step
stability and competitive equilibrium 1003follows from the optimality of Yi at prices p, and the fourth step follows from the
facts that py 5 qy and qQ =W 5 pQ =W; hence, Y ∈ DiðqÞ.
If Yi \W ≠ ∅, let fyg5 Yi \W; note that y ∈ argmaxw∈W pw as the trades in the
set W are perfectly substitutable and Yi is optimal given prices p. Now consider
F ∈ DiðqÞ. As jFi \Wj ∈ f0; 1g by mutual incompatibility of the trades in W, there
are two subcases to consider: If Fi \W5 ∅, then
Uið½F; qÞ5 Uið½F; pÞ ≤ Uið½Y; pÞ5 Uið½Y; qÞ;
where the first step follows from qQ =W 5 pQ =W, the second step follows from the
optimality of Yi at prices p, and the third step follows from the facts that py 5 qy
and qQ =W 5 pQ =W; hence, Y ∈ DiðqÞ. Alternatively, if Fi \W5 fJg, then
Uið½F; qÞ5 Uið½ðF =fJgÞ [ fyg; qÞ5 Uið½ðF =fJgÞ [ fyg; pÞ
≤ Uið½Y; pÞ5 Uið½Y; qÞ;
where the first step follows from perfect substitutability of the trades in W, the
second step follows from the facts that py 5 qy and qQ =W 5 pQ =W, the third step
follows from the optimality of Yi at prices p, and the fourth step follows from the
facts that py 5 qy and qQ =W 5 pQ =W; hence, Y ∈ DiðqÞ.
Second, we show that for an arbitrary agent j ≠ i, Y ∈ DjðqÞ. If Yj \W5 ∅, then
pYj 5 qYj while pQj→ 5 qQj→ and pQ→j ≤ qQ→j ; hence Y ∈ DjðqÞ. If Yj \W ≠ ∅, then Yj \
W5 fyg for some y because of mutual incompatibility of the trades in W for i;
note that y ∈ argmaxw∈W pw as the trades in the setW are perfectly substitutable and
Yi is optimal for i given prices p. Therefore, pYj 5 qYj while pQj→ 5 qQj→ and pQ→j ≤ qQ→j ;
hence Y ∈ DjðqÞ.
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